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Empirical Study on Influence of Optimization of Share Structure to Debt
Maturity
Dongxiao Liu*
School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, 430073, China
Abstract: Because of historical reasons, shares of listed companies were divided into tradable shares and non-tradable
shares, which could result to serious corporate governance problem. The Split Share Structure Reform, which started from
the year of 2005, is aiming to optimizing the share structure of listed company and bringing about a convergence of profit
target of all the share holders. It is worth for us to examine the change of ownership structure of listed companies in
mainland to see whether there is an impact on the debt maturity choice in the split share reform context. It has both theory
and practice guiding significance to analyze the relationship between share structure and debt maturity because share
structure is a main component of corporate governance. This paper adopts multiple linear regression models by using China
mainland listed company’s data to analyze the effect of debt maturity caused by share structure. It indicates that optimization
of share structure can relieve the profit conflict between major shareholders and minor shareholders, which can promote
company to select debt maturity appropriately and improve listed company’s performance at last.
Keywords: split share structure reform, share structure, debt maturity, ownership nature
1. INTRODUCTION
Share structure is the core of listed company’s governance, so optimization of share structure will lead to
significant effect for listed company on selection of debt maturity. Because of historical reasons, a port of share
can not circulate when company in mainland issued public offering. Thus, shares of listed companies are divided
into tradable shares and non-tradable shares. There are mainly eight problems caused by Share Split, which is
the basic reason leading to imperfection of corporate governance [1]. This article will focus on the perspective of
a listed company debt maturity choice, and try to explore whether foreign debt maturity theory can be verified in
the mainland on the unique context of the split share structure reform since the split share reform of listed
companies has a significant impact on corporate governance structure. It is worth for us to examine the change
of ownership structure of listed companies in mainland to see whether there is an impact on the debt maturity
choice in the split share reform context. From perspective of share structure of controlling shareholder, this
paper analyzes whether the convergence of the interests of shareholders has an impact on debt maturity selection
of listed companies during the period, in which non-tradable shares have access to circulation gradually.
Many scholars had found that controlling shareholder had a preference to long-term debt. For the sake of
different roles played by short-term debt and long-term debt, decision of debt maturity was a game result made
by all stakeholders [2]. Due to the presence of large shareholders, company managers had been supervised
directly and closely. From this perspective, the supervisory role of large shareholders can be an alternative to
short-term loans, so creditors could provide more long-term loans to promote business development [3].
Long-term debt financing played a role on the binding ability of managers to raise new capital, emphasizing that
the priority of long-term debt can prevent managers from financing for a non-profit project through future
earnings dilution [4]. Controlling shareholder had a strong preference for long-term debt financing, and this
preference may be more apparent when controlling shareholder’ interests were inconsistent with managers’ [5].
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Researcher suggested that compared with under-investment, controlling shareholder was more concerned about
liquidity risk [6]. In his statistic research, long-term debt was put in the first place when company had financial
plan. From this perspective, controlling shareholder may prefer long-term debt instead of short-term debt when
they were faced with fund shortage.
Compared with the long-term debt, some scholars had found that short-term debt can alleviate conflicts of
interests between large shareholders and small shareholders. To a certain extent, short-term debt can solve the
company’s agency problems. A clear and easy method to solve (avoid) under-investment was to shorten the
period of debt [7]. Researchers thought that major shareholders bored major risk of failure of investment, and
also had a higher voting for participation in the business decisions, so they had more power than small
shareholders [8]. As far as the implementation of management supervision was concerned, and supervision
efficiency from major shareholders was greatly higher as well. Therefore they may choose short-term debt. We
can find that a large proportion of shareholding and debt maturity choice may have a nonlinear relationship from
above the analysis. After the circulation, the interests of orientation of ultimate controlling shareholder was
relative to the value of listed companies, which confirmed that Split share structure reform had achieved the
desired effect of improving corporate governance [9]. Besides, researcher indicated that the split share reform of
listed mainland company improved the equity structure of listed companies in mainland China and also
contributed to corporate governance efficiency [10].
This article uses dynamic data during the split share reform of listed company to observe above questions
and hopes to enrich relative research results.
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1 Hypothesis
If controlling shareholders try their best to maximize their own interest by means of enhancing
performance of the company with their efforts, the supervisory role of large shareholders will replace the
governance and supervising role of short-term debt. Creditors are more willing to provide long-term debt, so the
proportion of long-term debt of listed companies will gradually increase. Based on the above analysis,
hypothesis 1is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Impact of share ratio of the largest shareholder on debt maturity decreased first and then
increased when share ratio reaches a point, showing a “U” correlation.
Controlling shareholders of state-owned companies are state-owned group company or controlling bodies
at all levels. Therefore, such controlling bodies may also have proxy behavior and lead to agency cost. Person in
charge of state-controlled institutions has no incentive to monitor behavior of listed companies controlled by
executives. Therefore, the hypothesis 2 is given:
Hypothesis 2: The state-owned controlling shareholder has negative correlation with debt maturity
structure.
As the controlling shareholder equity achieves right of access to circulation in batches，then the controlling
shareholder’s interests and the interests of small shareholders tend to be consistent. Compared with the
long-term debt, financing cost of short-term debt is lower. So controlling shareholder is no longer keen to seek
personal gain and prefers to choose lower-cost short-term debt in order to enhance the performance of the
company when faced with debt financing options. Based on above analysis, this paper considers that with shares
circulation, controlling shareholder is more prone to short-term. Hypothesis3 is posed
Hypothesis 3: For controlling shareholder, ratio of outstanding shares to the total shares has negative
correlation with debt maturity structure.
Proportion of outstanding shares owned by controlling shareholder to the total outstanding shares can be
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used to judge function constancy of interest between controlling shareholders and small investors. In addition,
ratio of outstanding shares owned by controlling shareholder to those owned by other shareholders can also be
used to analyze above question. With the interests of various stakeholders towards consistency, controlling
shareholder should be more inclined to choose the short-term debt in view of low financial cost. Therefore, the
hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5 are posed.
Hypothesis 4: Proportion of outstanding shares owned by controlling shareholder to the total outstanding
shares has negative correlation with the debt maturity structure.
Hypothesis 5: Ratio of outstanding shares owned by controlling shareholder to those owned by other
shareholders is negatively correlated to debt maturity structure.
2.2 Variable setting
Combined with extant research results, considering the share’s characteristics of listed company in
mainland, choice of debt maturity is defined as the dependent variable and ownership structure and other
indicators as explanatory variables. Debt maturity is defined as ratio of the proportion of long-term debt to total
debt measured. Existing literatures studying on the debt maturity always define long-term debt calculated in
three ways, including due book value method, the weighted method of book value of long-term debt and add
value method. According to financial information provided by financial statements of listed companies in
mainland, this paper selects expires the book value method, which measures the amount of the total number of
long-term debt as long-term debt value and selects ratio of long-term debt to total debt to measure debt maturity.
In addition, explanatory and controlling variables are also defined, which can be found in Table 1 deliberately.
Table 1.   Variable name and definition
Variable Definition of variable
DM long-term debt / total debt
RATIO Share Proportion of Controlling Shareholder / Total Shares
RATIO2 Square of Share Proportion of Controlling Shareholder
STATE If Controlling Shareholder is state body， STATE is 1,or it is 0.
FOUND1 Outstanding Shares Owned by Controlling Shareholder/the Total Shares Owned byThemselves
FOUND2 Outstanding Shares Owned by Controlling Shareholder/ Total Outstanding Shares
FOUND3 Outstanding Shares Owned by Controlling Shareholder/ Outstanding Shares Owned byOther Shareholders
ZH Total Share Ratio of the Second to the Tenth Large Shareholder / Total Shares
TAX Tax Expense/Profit before Tax
FCF Operating Cash Flow /（MB×Total Asset）
FIX Fix Asset/Total Asset
ROE Return /Net Asset
LEV Debt/Asset
SIZE the Natural Logarithm of Total Assets
MB Book Value of Asset /Market Value of Asset
INDU If company belongs to some industry T, INDU i  is 1，or it is 0.
YEAR If sample come from year T，YD t is 1，or it is 0
2.3 Model design
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2.4 Sample and descriptive statistics
According to research results，I select the 2007-2009 data of listed companies as samples in this study.
Since debt maturity decision will be greatly affected in the first IPO year when companies become listed one, in
order to limit impact of IPO, aiming company includes all the A-share listed company in Shanghai and shenzhen
Stock Exchange, which have already finished IPO in 2005. Then, each company’s financial information from
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January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2009 has been collected. So an annual total sample of mixed data for the study
has been established. Such data comes primarily from National Tai-database. In addition, the sample date is
clarified with following principles: (1) Sample companies are only A share listed companies in Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, So companies that issued other kind of share overseas will be deleted ; (2) Because
the financial company’s debt maturity is greatly inconsistent with debt maturity of company in other industries ,
financial listed companies are also deleted; (3) I also exclude ST and PT categories listed companies, because
the financial position of these companies is in unusual circumstances, which means these companies get more
than two years of consecutive losses. If they are not gotten rid of, conclusion in the study with such sample will
be seriously affected; (4) such company should also be excluded with abnormal financial indicates (the largest
shareholder equity ratio, debt maturity greater than 1 abnormal value and so on); (5) If relevant data can not be
found, such companies are forced to given up. According to these principles, 2799 annual mixed sample dates
for the study have been established finally. The tool for data process and statistical analysis is STATA11.0.
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
DM 0.142 0.065 0.179 0 0.924
RATIO 0.361 0.344 0.153 0.044 0.852
RATIO2 0.154 0.119 0.122 0.002 0.726
STATE 0.517 1 0.5 0 1
FOUND1 0.246 0 0.374 0 1
FOUND2 0.095 0 0.146 0 0.876
FOUND3 0.154 0 0.338 0 7.062
 As shown in Table 2, ratio of the long-term debt to total debt of listed companies ranges from the lowest
0.92 to the highest level of 0.92, and the mean is 0.14, indicating that mainland companies mainly use
short-term debt, compared to less use of long-term liabilities. State-owned companies can account for 52% of
the total listed companies, indicating the number of state-owned listed companies is more than
non-state-controlled listed companies, which mainly controlled by foreign fund or private companies. Mean and
median of Shares owned by controlling shareholder are 0.36 and 0.34 respectively, indicating the controlling
shareholder of listed companies in mainland China not only exist but also possess relatively high ratio which is
greatly different from that which companies in western country have.
Accounted for that fact that the mean ratio of outstanding shares owned by controlling shareholder is 0.25,
while the minimum ratio is 0 and the maximum ratio is 1, it indicates that only part of the sample companies
achieve full circulation within period during 2007-2009. Mean ratio of outstanding shares owned by controlling
shareholder to the outstanding shares reaches 0.25, while the minimum ratio is 0.1 and the maximum is 0.88,
reflecting after a long-lock period, the largest shareholder’s shares can be in circulation step by step, but
basically proportion of the circulation part is limited. Ratio of tradable shares possessed by controlling
shareholder to tradable shares owned by other shareholders means 0.15, indicating that after a period of short
time shares owned by controlling shareholder has not fully realized to circulate.
2.5 Correlation analysis
Through correlation analysis of variables, I find that although correlation of ratio associated with ratio2 is
more than 0.8, considering the latter is the square number of the former and both variables are important
explanatory variables into model, and it is acceptable to put the two variables simultaneously into the model. In
addition, correlation between FOUND1, FOUND2, and FOUND3 is greatly high, so it is sagacious to put these
variables into model one by one. Correlation between Other variables is low and accepted, which proves that
correlation impacts less on the regression results.
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3. RESEARCH RESLUT
3.1 Statistical results
Ordinary line regression model has assumptions of zero mean and equal variance. With variance analysis, I
found that problems of heteroskedasticity may exist. In order to get rid of the impact from heteroskedasticity, I
decide to use White OLS, after adjustment for multiple linear regression analysis, to research. As found1,
found2, found3 three explanatory variables are highly relevant, aiming to relieving effect of multicollinearity,
these three explanatory variables will be put into the regression model respectively one by one.
Table 3.  Relationship between debt maturity and share structure
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DM DM DM
RATIO -0.317*** -0.263*** -0.293***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.004)
RATIO2 0.412*** 0.375*** 0.409***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
FOUND1 -0.021**
(0.042)
FOUND2 -0.089***
(0.002)
FOUND3 -0.027**
(0.045)
STATE -0.011 -0.014** -0.011*
(0.100) (0.039) (0.098)
ZH 0.055* 0.057* 0.059**
(0.064) (0.054) (0.046)
LEV 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.129***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FIX 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.185***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROE -0.063* -0.070** -0.065**
(0.050) (0.029) (0.041)
SIZE 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF -0.229*** -0.228*** -0.228***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TAX -0.015 -0.015* -0.015
(0.108) (0.100) (0.106)
MB -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.196) (0.343) (0.207)
Constant -0.687*** -0.720*** -0.705***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2 799 2 799 2 799
Adjusted R-squared 0.314 0.316 0.314
Note: * stand for 10% significance level
** stand for 5% significance level
*** stand for 1% significance level
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3.2 Analysis
As shown in Table 3, in the three regressions, the share proportion of the largest shareholder and debt
maturity structure show a significant negative correlation, and this negative correlation is significance at 1%
level. The ratio of the square of the largest shareholder and debt maturity structure has a positive relation, which
is also significant at level 1%. This outcome shows that when the share ratio is low, the controlling shareholder
tends to raise funds by short-term debt. After share proportion reaches to a higher point, if share proportion
increases continually, the controlling shareholder will change and tend to use long-term debt to raise funds. Thus,
the share proportion of the largest shareholder and debt maturity shows “U” shaped relationship. Based above
analysis, hypothesis 1 has been well verified. The nature of the state-owned controlling shareholder has a
negative impact on debt maturity, significantly at 10% level (in model 1 and model 3) and 5% in model 2
respectively. So hypothesis2 is confirmed. For controlling shareholder, ratio of outstanding shares to the total
shared has negative correlation with debt maturity structure and shows significant level of 5%, hypothesis 3 can
be verified. Proportion of outstanding shares owned by controlling shareholder to the total outstanding shares is
negative correlated with the debt maturity structure and significant at 1% level, thus hypothesis 4 is verified.
Ratio of outstanding shares owned by controlling shareholder to those owned by other shareholders is negatively
related to debt maturity structure and significant at 1% level, therefore hypothesis 5 can be proved. These three
explanatory variables are all highly significant, indicating that as the shares possessed by controlling shareholder
go to circulation; all shareholders’ interests function will gradually reach convergence. Thus, controlling
shareholder tend to use short-term debt to raise funds in view of lower-cost.
3.3 Robustness checks
It is possible that using different measures of debt maturity structure may come to different conclusions.
For this factor, I replace long-term debt used in model with new long-term debt that is defined as total number
of the major long-term debt including long-term loans, bonds payable and long-term payables, measuring
whether research outcome is robust or not. After regression by using new long-term debt, I find that the main
conclusion remains stable, which confirms that my research result is acceptable. In addition, I clarify data and
choose company whose financial data is complete within three years to gain a new sample. Then, I make use of
a random effects model with this short-term panel data to regress. Then, I find that the new result in accordance
with previous one and the main conclusion remains stable as well, indicating the relationship between
independent variables and the dependent variable is acceptable. In this paper, I also consider endogenous
problem and test whether endogenous problem is serious enough to affect research result. The endogenous
model test found that debt maturity structure have little effect on outstanding shares ratio of controlling
shareholder as well as other explanatory variables , which shows that there are no serious endogenous problems
in the model.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper focuses on the impact of debt maturity choice made by change of share structure of controlling
shareholder in the background of the split share structure reform. Through empirical study of 2007-2009
mainland companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, I have found that a significant “U” shaped
relationship between controlling shareholder equity ratio and debt maturity structure exist. With the non-tradable
stock equity coming to circulation in batch, interest function of controlling shareholder will be promoted to
converge with other minority shareholders, basically reducing the company’s agency costs. In addition, this
paper finds that the nature of state-owned shareholders equity and debt has a negative correlation and this
relationship is obviously significant. Consistent with the existing literature, this paper finds that share union of
other large shareholders has effected a significant positive correlation to debt maturity, indicating that equity
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balance to a certain extent can restrict controlling shareholder’s self-serving behavior. Split share structure
reform has a significant impact on change of share possessed by controlling shareholder who is mainly reflected
in two aspects: First, for controlling shareholder formerly non-tradable share can go to circulation step by step;
Secondly, share ratio will decrease.
According to results from the study , it is obviously concluded that accompanying controlling shareholder
equity to circulate, interests of controlling shareholders and other shareholders will be convergence, which can
solve basic and core corporate governance problem existed before. Just because of previous analysis showing
that financial cost of short-term debt is lower, controlling shareholder may be inclined to select short-term debt,
reflecting perfection of corporate governance structure optimization through split share structure reform.
Besides, analyzed from the share ratio, shares held by controlling shareholder are still high and share
concentration ratio may still be a problem. When faced with debt maturity choice, a "U" shaped relationship
between ratio of shares owned by controlling shareholder and debt maturity exist, indicating that only all shares
circulation is not enough. The main conclusions are as follows:
Firstly, it should further optimize the corporate governance structure, mainly including optimize ownership
concentration by reducing share proportion of the controlling shareholder, promoting other minority
shareholders to participate in corporate governance, encouraging institutional investors playing more active
roles on corporate governance .
Secondly, it is sagacious to guide small shareholders to actively participate in voting for major company
operating matters，which finally prompt companies made reasonable debt maturity decision faced with raising
funds and improve the company’s operating performance at last.
Thirdly, institutional investor should play more role in corporate governance, which can greatly prevent
controlling shareholder from making decision to grab small shareholders.
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